We investigate the performance-induced gambling propensity of mutual fund managers by examining their tendency to adjust fund return skewness in response to interim performance. Managers of interim underperforming funds are more likely to increase fund return skewness in the second half of the year than their counterparts, especially in regions with favorable gambling environments or during market downturns. The evidence is robust to the control of managerial volatility-seeking behavior. We further reveal that fund managers alter fund return skewness through adjusting portfolio diversification or portfolio exposures to stocks with higher expected coskewness, and that their gambling behavior erodes fund value.
Introduction
Literature has suggested that people's desire to gamble is carried over into their investment decisions and reflected in their preference for assets with high (positive) skewness in the financial markets (see, for example, Friedman and Savage (1948) , Markowitz (1952) , Shiller (2000) , Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Barberis and Huang (2008) , Kumar (2009) , Kumar et al. (2012) ). Assets with positively skewed payoffs offer lower expected returns, but grant investors a small chance of achieving an extremely high return. Though such assets generally underperform, investors with a desire to gamble are willing to hold them and to sacrifice their mean-variance efficiency for the tiny probability of earning a huge reward.
In this paper, we investigate the gambling behavior of a group of institutional investors: mutual fund managers. The current mutual fund literature includes numerous studies on mutual fund returns (first moment) and risk taking incentives (second moment), but few studies on their gambling behavior (third moment). This study, to our knowledge, is the first comprehensive study of mutual fund gambling. In particular, we investigate whether fund managers, when encountering inferior interim performance, gamble through seeking higher fund return skewness, and whether their performance-induced gambling behavior is affected by local gambling environment and market conditions. We also identify potential channels through which fund managers alter fund return skewness by examining their active adjustment of portfolio composition.
Our study is motivated by research on the variation in people's gambling desire across states.
Both Friedman and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952) provide theories suggesting that an increase in income that raises an individual's relative position within his own class yields diminishing marginal utility, while an increase that shifts the individual to a new social and economic status yields increasing marginal utility. Thus individuals dissatisfied with their current income or in a lower social class are more likely to accept gambles, which provide a good chance of lifting them out of their current class and into a higher status on the socioeconomic ladder. Many following studies present supportive evidence indicating that status-seeking individuals exhibit a stronger propensity to participate in lotteries (e.g., Brunk (1981) , Brenner (1983) , Clotfelter and Cook (1989) , Becker et al. (2000) ). Kumar (2009) further shows that relatively poor individuals also tend to gamble in the stock market by investing disproportionately more in stocks with lottery-like features. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) advance the work of Friedman and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952) into prospect theory, which maintains that individuals evaluate risk differently in the domains of gains and losses and thus a prior outcome will affect their subsequent choices. As Kahneman and Tversky put it, "a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise". Thaler and Johnson (1990) extend the study of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and contend that a prior loss may induce people to engage in gambling activities, which offer a good opportunity to break even, and that the "break even" effect is especially attractive when the gambling allows the subjects to cancel or ignore their prior outcomes and when the downside of gambling is limited. Post et al. (2008) examine the risky choices of contestants in a popular TV game show "Deal or No Deal" and find that contestants' willingness to gamble increases after misfortune due to incomplete adaptation to prior losses, confirming the break even effect.
In light of the aforementioned studies, we conjecture that interim fund performance could affect fund managers' gambling propensity in subsequent periods. The utility functions of Friedman and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952) predict that managers of interim underperforming funds are more likely to accept gambles as the move from "losing" to "winning" generates increasing marginal utility. Managers of interim outperforming funds, nevertheless, will have less incentives to take a bet as the utility they attach to the upward shift in their current class may not be sufficient to justify the risk. Both the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the break even effect of Thaler and Johnson (1990) generate similar prediction. The presence of a prior loss could elevate fund managers' gambling desire. And as the interim underperformance can be facilely integrated with outcomes in the second half of the year, the willingness to gamble will increase for managers of mid-year losing funds who are eager to make up for their prior deficiencies.
Fund managers' performance-induced gambling propensity could be further enhanced by the special feature of the mutual fund tournament setting. In a typical mutual fund tournament, the winning funds obtain the lion's share of both compensation and fund flows, while the losing funds are not punished to an equivalent extent. The convexity of such a reward scheme implies that managers who fail in their gambling will not face harsh punishment, while the reward for managers who succeed through gambling is huge.
To empirically investigate the performance-induced gambling propensity of mutual fund managers, we examine whether they adjust fund return skewness according to their interim performance.
If interim performance affects fund managers' gambling incentives inversely as expected, managers of mid-year losing funds would increase fund return skewness more aggressively than their counterparts in the second half of the year .
We also extend our investigation to examine the impact of exogenous factors on fund man-agers' performance-induced gambling propensity. Two such factors considered are local gambling norms and market conditions. Kumar et al. (2012) find that regional socioeconomic characteristics, including religious beliefs, influence investors' gambling desire and their portfolio decisions by shaping local gambling attitudes. They contend that people's gambling propensity is stronger in regions with a higher concentration of Catholics relative to Protestants, as many Protestant churches view gambling as sinful, while the Roman Catholic Church maintains a more tolerant attitude toward gambling and speculative activities. They present empirical evidence showing that the dominant local religion forms local gambling norms and consequently affects the financial decisions of individuals located in the region, even if they do not adhere to the dominant local faith themselves.
Motivated by Kumar et al. (2012) , we examine whether fund managers' performance-induced gambling incentives are affected by the surrounding gambling environment. If fund managers care about local attitudes toward gambling, we could expect managers of losing funds to be more cautious about launching into gambling when the local culture holds a stringent view on such behavior. The decision to gamble would be much easier to make for other managers of funds located in regions with more liberal views toward gambling. We follow Kumar et al. (2012) in using the CatholicProtestant ratio (CPRATIO), the proportion of Catholic to Protestant adherents in a region, to capture local gambling attitudes. We expect managers located in high (low) CPRATIO regions to increase their fund return skewness more (less) actively in the second half of the year if they have underperformed in the first half of the year. 1 Lotteries studies suggest that people gamble more when the economic prospect is dimmed. Mikesell (1994) shows that lottery sales increase with the unemployment rate, which he argues is consistent with the notion that the small chance of winning a large prize is particularly attractive during recessions. Brenner and Brenner (1990) point out that while the price level dropped significantly and the unemployment rate soared during the Great Depression of the 1930s in the U.S., the interest in lotteries and other forms of gambling was at its height. Kumar (2009) shows that similar to the demand for state lotteries, the demand for stocks with lottery-like features in the stock market is higher during economic downturns. If the tiny chance of winning a large payoff is 1 Shu et al. (2012) investigate the influence of religious beliefs on mutual fund managers' risk-taking behavior. They find that funds in regions with a higher concentration of Catholics, or a lower concentration of Protestants, have higher return volatility and display stronger tournament behavior, findings consistent with the notion that Catholics (Protestants) exhibit a less (more) pronounced aversion to speculation risk than the average population. Our study differs from Shu et al. (2012) in that while they focus on the relation between religious beliefs and fund managers' volatility-seeking behavior, we emphasize fund managers' skewness-adjusting incentives and their interaction with religion-induced local gambling norms.
especially sweet during recessions as demonstrated in these studies, and its attractiveness outweighs the importance of employment risk, managers of underperforming funds would tend to increase their exposure to skewness to a greater extent during market downturns. 2 Using information on fund holdings and trades, we examine the mechanism through which managers adjust fund return skewness. Such an investigation would provide direct evidence on fund managers' gambling incentives and give us a better understanding of how fund managers alter fund return skewness by adjusting the composition of their portfolios. We carry out the investigation from two perspectives: 1) the adjustment of portfolio diversification, and 2) the selection of stocks.
Though traditional finance theory suggests that investors should hold diversified portfolios to eliminate non-compensated risk, many investors choose to stay under-diversified in reality (e.g., Barber and Odean (2000), Polkovnichenko (2005) , Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) ). Mitton and Vorkink (2007) develop a model that incorporates investors' heterogeneous preference for skewness and show that investors seeking for skewness would intentionally select to under-diversify as diversification erodes portfolio return skewness. They confirm their model implications by showing empirically that investors make trade-off between diversification and skewness using portfolio holdings of individual investors obtained from a large brokerage house. A higher level of portfolio return skewness could also be realized through the selection of stocks. Investors seeking for skewness could achieve their goal by adding more stocks with higher expected coskewness into their portfolios (Harvey and Siddique (2000) ). Motivated by these studies, we expect managers of interim losing funds, with a stronger gambling propensity and preference for skewness, to reduce fund portfolio diversification and/or increase portfolio exposures to stocks with higher expected coskewness after mid-year.
The foregoing conjectures lead to five main testable hypotheses: Hypothesis 1. Relative to managers of interim outperforming funds, managers of interim underperforming funds increase fund return skewness more in the second half of the year.
Hypothesis 2. Managers of funds located in regions with a higher Catholic-Protestant ratio have a stronger propensity to increase fund return skewness in the second half of the year in response to 2 Kempf et al. (2009) argue that the managerial volatility-seeking behavior depends on the relative importance of employment risk to compensation incentives. Fund managers with poor interim performance tend to reduce fund volatility during bear markets as they are more concerned about keeping their jobs. We conjecture that the temporal variation in fund managers' gambling incentives could exhibit a different pattern if their gambling propensity and conventional risk-taking tendency are influenced by different sets of factors. The thrill of gambling, which is intensified by the gloomy economic prospect, might outweigh the importance of employment risk for managers with strong gambling desire.
inferior interim performance.
Hypothesis 3. The desire of managers of interim underperforming funds to increase fund return skewness is stronger in bear markets than in bull markets.
Hypothesis 4. Managers of interim underperforming funds have a stronger propensity to reduce their portfolio diversification in the second half of the year.
Hypothesis 5. Managers of interim underperforming funds have a stronger propensity to increase their portfolio exposures to stocks with higher expected coskewness in the second half of the year.
Our empirical results support all the hypotheses. We find that managers of funds that have fallen behind by mid-year increase fund return skewness aggressively in the second half of the year.
The negative relation between interim fund performance and the change in fund return skewness is significantly different from zero at the 1% level and holds in various model specifications. In terms of economic significance, the worst-performed managers tend to increase their fund return skewness by 15% more than do the best-performed managers over the second half of the year. Moreover, funds that belong to a smaller fund family, older funds, funds with lower fund flows over the past year, a higher turnover ratio, or a higher expense ratio, and funds that belong to the growth segment have a greater propensity to increase their return skewness in response to interim underperformance.
Fund managers' performance-induced gambling propensity is influenced by religion-induced local gambling culture. Managers of funds located in regions with a higher concentration of Catholics (Protestants) exhibit stronger (weaker) incentives to increase fund return skewness when they have underperformed. The magnitude of the negative relation between the change in fund return skewness and interim performance increases significantly with the Catholic-Protestant ratio, consistent with the conjecture that managers of funds located in regions with a favorable gambling environment are more prone to increase fund return skewness and rely on their luck when lagging behind.
Fund managers' gambling behavior also varies with market conditions. We define market conditions based on average market returns or NBER-dated business cycles. Time-series analysis reveals that unlike the pattern observed in their risk-taking behavior, managers of mid-year losing funds increase fund return skewness more in bear markets than in bull markets. This result is consistent with the finding of Kumar (2009) that investors' propensity to gamble in the stock market is higher during economic downturns.
Based on information on mutual fund holdings, we find that managers with poor interim performance reduce portfolio diversification substantially in the second half of the year. The result is robust to different measures of portfolio diversification. Further, tests performed at the individual stock level show that stocks with higher expected coskewness are most likely to be selected by funds with poor interim performance. And both portfolio-and trade-based analysis performed at the fund level shows that managers are more likely to increase portfolio exposures to stocks with higher expected coskewness after mid-year underperformance. The evidence remains when we control for fund managers' volatility-seeking behavior and a series of fund characteristics. These results not only reveal how fund managers alter their fund return skewness, but also render additional support to our Hypothesis 1 by showing that managers of underperforming funds do adjust their portfolio diversification and composition to achieve a higher fund return skewness.
One important consideration in testing these hypotheses is to differentiate fund managers' gambling desire from their conventional risk-taking behavior, which has been studied extensively in the literature on mutual fund tournaments (see, for example, Brown et al. (1996) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Basak et al. (2007) , Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) , Chen and Pennacchi (2009) ). These studies show that mid-year losing funds have stronger incentives to increase fund return volatility in the second half of the year. The skewness-adjusting practices and volatility-seeking behavior of fund managers differ in a significant way. Expected return is positively related to volatility, but is negatively related to skewness. Fund managers who increase fund volatility expect to earn higher average returns as they take on more risk. They act as traditional investors and make trade-offs between risk and return within the mean-variance framework. Manager who increase their fund return skewness are, nevertheless, expected to end up with negative excess returns as they actually pay a premium for a small chance of winning a large prize.
In the empirical tests, we control for the change in fund return volatility when examining fund managers' incentives to adjust fund return skewness. The results show that the change in fund return volatility does not have a significant impact on the change in fund return skewness, and that even after controlling for the change in fund return volatility, mid-year underperforming funds still exhibit a stronger propensity to increase fund return skewness than their counterparts in the second half of the year.
Lastly, we examine the performance consequences of fund managers' skewness-adjusting behavior. We show that funds that have experienced an increase in return skewness, a decrease in portfolio diversification, or an expansion in portfolio exposures to stocks with higher expected coskewness underperform in subsequent periods. The influence of fund managers' skewness-adjusting behavior on subsequent fund performance is both statistically and economically significant. In unreported tests, we divide sample funds into quintiles based on the change in fund return skewness, and find that on average funds in the top quintile underperform funds in the bottom quintile by 0.10% (t = 2.71) per month after the adjustment of market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors over the following 6 months. This evidence that gambling activities adversely influence performance is consistent with the finding of Kumar (2009) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and summary statistics. Section 3 investigates whether fund managers adjust fund return skewness in response to interim performance. Sections 4 and 5 examine the influence of local gambling norms and market conditions on fund managers' skewness-adjusting incentives, respectively. Section 6 provides additional evidence on fund managers' performance-induced skewness-adjusting behavior using information on fund portfolio holdings and trades. Section 7 analyzes the performance consequences of managerial skewness adjusting. Section 8 concludes the paper. We focus our analysis on actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds that invest at least 80% of their assets in common stocks and have total net assets of no less than $1 million. Information on investment objectives from the CRSP mutual fund database is used to define the market segments in which our sample funds operate. We include funds that belong to the investment objectives of "Aggressive Growth", "Growth", "Maximum Capital Gains", "Small Capitalization Growth", "Long Term Growth", or "Growth and Income". We exclude balanced, bond, money market, international, index, and sector funds. We broadly classify the sample funds into two segments:
"growth" and "growth and income". We also manually collect mutual fund location information from the SEC database for company filings and assign the annual county-level religion data to each fund accordingly. Due to the limitations of the ARDA data, our analysis of the influence of local religious beliefs on fund managers' gambling incentives is restricted to the post-1980 period. Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample mutual funds. Average total net assets under management is $581 million, and average fund family size is $952 million. The funds in the 3 Wiesenberger objective codes, strategic insights objective codes, and Lipper objective codes are considered in identifying fund style. Mutual funds with an investment objective of "Aggressive Growth", "Growth", "Maximum Capital Gains", "Small Capitalization Growth", or "Long Term Growth" are classified as growth funds. Mutual funds with an investment objective of "Growth and Income" or "Growth and Current Income" are classified as growth and income funds. 4 The ARDA divides congregations into five groups: Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Orthodox, and other groups. We follow Hilary sample have an average age of 17 and typically invest 93.14% of their fund assets in common stocks.
Summary statistics
Fund flow is defined as the growth rate of fund assets after adjusting for asset appreciation, and we winsorize it at the 1% level at both the head and tail of the distribution. The mean and median of fund flow are 10.48% and -1.76% per year, respectively. Maximum total load is the sum of the maximum front and rear loads of a fund. A typical fund in the sample has a total fund load of 3.45%. Turnover ratio is the minimum of aggregate purchases of securities or aggregate sales of securities, divided by the average T N A of the fund in a year. Expense ratio is the ratio of total investment shareholders pay for the fund's operating expenses. The average annual turnover and expense ratios for the sample mutual funds are 72.38% and 1.10%, respectively. We measure fund return volatility (skewness) as the standard deviation (skewness) of monthly fund returns during each year. Average fund return volatility and skewness are 5.04% and -9.21% per year, respectively.
The negative value for average return skewness suggests that the sample funds make small gains most of the time, but encounter large losses very occasionally.
The last three rows report summary statistics for county-level religion data for the sample funds. [Insert Table 1 
Baseline regressions
We estimate the following model:
where ∆s it is the change in the return skewness of fund i from the first to the second half of year t, Ret it is fund i's compound return in the first six months of the year, Rank it is fund i's interim performance rank, ∆σ it is the change in fund return volatility from the first to the second half of the year, ∆s m it is the median change in fund return skewness in the segment of fund i, and s (1) it is the return skewness of fund i in the first half of the year.
∆σ it is included in the model to explicitly control for the risk-taking behavior of fund i in year By analogy, we include ∆s m it and s (1) it in the regression. If segment skewness varies due to exogenous shocks that also affect the return skewness of fund i, ∆s m it will be positively associated with ∆s it . And if there is mean reversion in fund return skewness, the coefficient on s
it will be significantly negative.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the regression results. Time-fixed effects are controlled in all regressions. In column (1) , where ∆s it is regressed on Ret it with ∆σ it , ∆s m it , and s
it controlled for, the coefficient on interim fund return is -0.9631 (t = -26.21). The significantly negative coefficient on interim fund return suggests that managers of underperforming (outperforming) funds tend to increase (reduce) their fund return skewness in the second half of the year. The coefficient on ∆σ it is indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the skewness adjusting behavior of fund managers is not driven by their volatility seeking activities. The coefficients on ∆s m it and s (1) it are significantly positive and negative, respectively, as expected.
We add more fund characteristics in the regression in columns (2) and (3) to address the possibility that fund characteristics influence the propensity of fund managers to adjust fund return skewness: (2) where T N A it−1 , F F size it−1 , and Age it−1 are the logarithms of fund size, fund family size, and fund age, respectively. F low it−1 is fund flow over the past 12 months. D Load it−1 is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i charges either a front or rear load, or both, and zero otherwise. T urn it−1 and Exp it−1 are fund turnover and the expense ratio, respectively. All control variables are measured at the end of year t − 1. The segment-fixed effect is controlled for in both columns (2) and (3), and standard errors are clustered by fund in column (3).
The control of various fund characteristics does not subsume the negative relation between interim fund performance and the change in fund return skewness. The coefficient on Ret it is -1.0030 (t = -25.28) in column (2) and -0.9961 (t = -19.25) in column (3). The result in column (3) implies that a one standard deviation decrease in the interim fund return (11.52%) is associated with a 11.48% increase in ∆s it . In all three columns, the coefficient on ∆σ it is indistinguishable from zero. The results suggest that the relation between interim performance and skewness change is robust to the control of fund characteristics and fund managers' risk-taking behavior.
In columns (4) to (6), we replace Ret it with Rank it , fund i's interim performance ranking among all sample funds in year t. 5 Employing Rank it instead of Ret it could reduce the influence of observations with extreme return values. The results are qualitatively similar to those in columns (1) to (3). The coefficient on Rank it is around -0.15 and is significantly negative at the 1% level in all three columns. The results indicate that the worst-performed managers tend to increase their fund return skewness by 15% more than do the best-performed managers over the second half of the year. Overall, these results lend strong support to Hypothesis 1.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Robustness checks
To examine the robustness of the results shown in Section 3.1, we further the investigation through alternative model specifications and subsample tests.
Unexpected change in fund return skewness
Literature has documented that stocks with lower returns tend to have higher subsequent skewness (see, for example, Harvey and Siddique (2000), Boyer et al. (2010) ). Some might argue that funds with lower past returns are expected to have higher skewness even without fund managers' gambling incentives, given the time-series properties of returns documented in these studies. To confirm that the negative relation between mid-year fund performance and the change in fund return skewness shown in Panel A of Table 2 reflects fund managers' skewness preference, we proceed to examine the relation between fund interim performance and the unexpected change in fund return skewness.
In each year, we randomly select 100 stocks from the CRSP stock universe to form a portfolio.
We repeat the process 1,000 times to generate 1,000 stock portfolios, which could be viewed as hypothetical mutual funds. For each portfolio in each year, we calculate its cumulative monthly return (r pt on subsequent portfolio return skewness s
The estimated coefficients are applied to sample mutual fund return data in the first half of year t to get the expected fund return skewness in the second half of the year (ŝ it (2) ):
where Ret
it , and s (1) it are realized cumulative return, return volatility, and return skewness of fund i in the first six months of year t.ŝ it (2) incorporates the influence that time-series properties of past fund returns might have on subsequent fund return skewness. We use the difference between the realized and expected fund return skewness in the second half of the year as a more purified measure of the skewness preference of fund managers:
We re-run Eq. (1) and (2) using the unexpected change in fund return skewness, or ∆s U E it , as the dependent variable, and report the results in columns (1) and (2) in Panel B of Table 2 . The coefficient on Rank it is significantly negative at the 1% level in both columns, suggesting that midyear underperforming funds are more likely to have unexpected increases in fund return skewness in the second half of the year. The results confirm that the negative relation between interim fund performance and the change in fund return skewness is not simply driven by the time-series properties of fund returns, but reflects the skewness-seeking tendency of fund managers who have fallen behind by mid-year.
Bootstrapped standard errors
There might be concerns that residuals from regressing changes in skewness on explanatory variables are likely to follow a non-normal distribution. One solution is to calculate t-statistics of the estimated coefficients based on bootstrapped standard errors. The results are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Panel B. 6 The t-values of the coefficients on Rank it are very close to those obtained from the baseline regressions, alleviating the concern that our previous results are biased. 7 
Non-linear shifting in fund return volatility
It is possible that the change in fund return skewness is just picking up the effect brought by the non-linear shift in fund return volatility from the first to the second half of the year. We thus further control for the square of the change in fund return volatility, or ∆σ 2 it , in the regression. The results are shown columns (5) and (6) of Panel B of Table 2 . Both the magnitude and t-value of the estimated coefficients on Rank it remain similar to those in Panel A. The only noticeable difference is that the coefficient on ∆σ it turns to be significantly negative, while the coefficient on ∆σ 2 it is significantly positive. The evidence suggests that the non-linear shifting in fund return volatility contributes to the changes in fund return skewness to some degree, but has no significant influence on the negative relation between fund interim performance and the change in fund return skewness.
Piecewise linear regressions
To further examine the relation between interim fund performance and the change in fund return skewness, we conduct piecewise linear regressions in the last two columns of Panel B of Table 2 .
Rank Low it and Rank
High it are fund performance rank in the bottom and top 50 th percentiles, and are defined as min(Rank it , 0.5) and max(0, Rank it − 0.5), respectively. All other control variables are the same as in previous tests.
Columns (7) and (8) is greater than that of the coefficient on Rank Low it . The results suggest that while losing funds tend to increase their fund return skewness, winning funds are even more aggressive in reducing fund return skewness in the follwing periods.
Contingency table approach
In unreported test, we also examine the relation between interim fund performance and the changes in fund return skewness though a contingency table approach, which is a simple nonparametric test and has been adopted in prior studies on mutual fund tournament (see, for example, Brown et al. (1996) ). Specifically, we assign each sample fund into one of the four cells in a 2 × 2 contingency table based on whether its interim performance and the change in its fund return skewness from the first to the second half of the year is above or below the median. Untabulated results show that the percentage of funds falling into the low mid-year return and high skewness increase cell significantly exceeds 25%, which renders further support to our conjecture that mid-year losing funds increase their return skewness in the following months more aggressively.
Subsample tests
Panel C of Table 2 presents the results of regressions performed in various subsamples, where we control for time-and segment-fixed effects as well as various fund characteristics, and cluster the standard errors of estimated coefficients by fund. The exclusion of 10% smallest funds, 10% largest funds, 10% funds with the lowest mid-year returns, or 10% funds with the highest mid-year returns has little influence on the significantly negative relation between interim fund performance and the change in fund return skewness. In addition, we show that fund managers' performance-induced gambling propensity is evident in both periods before and after 2000, and is stronger in the more recent period. 8 
Influence of fund characteristics
We now examine the influence of fund characteristics on the performance-induced skewnessadjusting behavior of fund managers. A dummy approach is adopted in the analysis, where dummies are used to indicate the group to which a fund belongs:
where D it is defined based on fund size, family size, age, fund flow, fund load, fund return volatility realized in the past year, turnover ratio, expense ratio, or the segment to which the fund belongs.
For brevity, we report only the coefficients on Rank it and and its interaction with the dummy Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The results suggest that old funds, funds with a high turnover ratio, or funds that belong to the growth segment are more likely to increase fund return skewness when they have underperformed.
Funds that belong to a large fund family or levies a load are less likely to increase fund return skewness in response to inferior interim performance. Managers of funds with higher fund inflows over the past year also have weaker incentives to increase fund return skewness when underperformed.
The evidence implies that managers with an ongoing record of abundant inflows are more cautious about gambling, while managers of funds for which fund flows have dried up become desperate and tend to pin their hopes on gambling. Fund size, fund past return volatility, or fund expense ratio do not have a significant impact on fund managers' tendency to adjust fund return skewness conditional on interim performance. 
where P ROT it , CAT H it , and CP RAT IO it represent local Protestant concentration, local Catholic concentration, and the proportion of the population of Catholics to that of Protestants, respectively.
The coefficients on the interaction terms indicate the strength of the influence of religious beliefs on fund managers' performance-induced skewness-adjusting behavior. The regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 4 .
In column (1), the coefficient on the interaction term between Protestant ratio and interim fund performance is significantly positive. The evidence is consistent with the conjecture that funds located in areas with more Protestants, who generally have an unfavorable view of gambling, are less likely to increase fund return skewness in response to poor mid-year performance. Column (2) shows that the coefficient on the interaction term between Catholic concentration and fund performance rank is significantly negative, suggesting that funds located in regions with more Catholics are more likely to increase their fund return skewness in the second half of the year if they have underperformed by mid-year. The coefficients on P ROT it and CAT H it are significantly negative and positive, respectively, suggesting that funds located in areas with a high concentration of Protestants (Catholics) tend to reduce (increase) their fund return skewness unconditionally in the second half of the year, which may serve as further evidence of religion-induced variation in the strength of fund managers' gambling incentives across regions.
In column (3), we use CP RAT IO it to measure regional gambling attitudes. Consistent with our prediction laid out in Hypothesis 2, funds located in regions with more Catholics than Protestants have stronger performance-induced gambling incentives. The coefficient on the interaction term between CP RAT IO it and mid-year fund performance is -0.0064 (t = -3.71), which is significantly negative at the 1% level. In columns (4) to (6), we include various fund characteristics in the regressions, including T N A, fund family size, fund age, fund flow, a dummy indicating whether fund i charges a load, turnover ratio, and expense ratio. The results are similar to those in columns
(1) to (3). Managers of funds located in areas with a more favorable gambling environment exhibit a greater propensity to increase fund return skewness when embarrassed by poor interim performance, confirming that local culture norms influence the gambling incentives of fund managers. clustering in a few regions, we exclude funds located in these states, reperform the regression of Eq.
(9) with the control of fund characteristics, and report the results in Panel B of Table 4 . The results are robust when we drop funds located in Massachusetts, New York, or California. Even when we remove funds located in these three states altogether, which will reduce our sample size by around 50%, the coefficient on the interaction term between Rank it and CP RAT IO t is still significantly negative, though its t-value is reduced substantially to -1.68. In addition, the coefficient on Rank it is significantly negative at the 1% level in all cases. The evidence confirms that the documented fund managers' skewness-adjusting behavior as well as the influence of local religious beliefs on such behavior is not driven by sample funds located in certain areas only.
Skewness adjusting in different market conditions

Kempf et al. (2009) investigate the risk-taking behavior of mutual fund managers in bull and
bear markets. They show that during bear markets, when employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, managers of interim losing funds tend to reduce fund volatility more than do those of winning funds. During bull markets, when employment risk is low and compensation incentives dominate, managers of underperforming funds are more likely to increase fund return volatility to catch up with the winners.
Market conditions might have different effects on managers' volatility-and skewness-seeking incentives. These two kinds of behavior have distinct motives, which could have different variations in bull and bear markets. As skewness-seeking among fund managers is largely driven by their gambling propensity rather than by a conventional trade-off between risk and return, employment risk might not be the most important factor they bear in mind. Moreover, lottery studies have suggested that people are more attracted to various forms of gambling when economic opportunities are not bright (e.g., Mikesell (1994) , Brenner and Brenner (1990) ). Consistent with this conjecture, Kumar (2009) shows that individual investors' propensity to gamble in the stock market also increases during economic downturns. If, as with individual investors, mutual fund managers' desire to gamble is greater during economic downturns, the funds trailing their counterparts halfway through the year are more likely to increase their fund return skewness during bear markets than in bull markets.
Yearly regressions
We begin by estimating Eq. (1), with Ret it replaced by Rank it , each year from 1962 to 2009. We present yearly estimates of the rank coefficients in Table 5 [Insert Table 5 They claim that mid-year market returns are a more appropriate measure than year-end returns as fund managers do not know the latter when they decide to adjust their portfolios in the middle of the year. We employ a method analogous to theirs by measuring market conditions based on the average monthly excess market return in the first half of the year. In Fig. 1 , we plot the coefficient on Rank it from yearly regressions over time along with the average monthly excess market return in the first half of each year.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The solid line in Fig. 1 represents the average monthly excess market return, and the dashed line portrays the coefficient on fund interim performance rank. The figure graphically illustrates the generally positive relation between market conditions and the estimated coefficient on Rank it , implying that underperforming funds are more likely to increase fund return skewness in bearish markets than in bullish markets.
Regressions with dummy variables
We now employ dummies in regressions that more rigorously test the influence of market conditions on fund managers' skewness-adjusting behavior. We assume the market is in an upward (downward) trend in year t if the average excess market return in the first six months is positive (negative). 9 A dummy variable D U t (D D t ) is equal to one for years in which the market is in an upward (downward) trend and equals zero for other periods. We also define market conditions using NBER-dated expansion/recession periods. Years in which at least six months are part of an NBER expansion (recession) cycle are assigned a dummy variable D E t (D R t ) that equals one. We estimate the influence of market conditions on fund managers' performance-induced skewness-adjusting tendency using the following model and present the results in Table 6 :
[Insert Table 6 about here]
In column (1), the change in the return skewness of fund i is regressed on its interim performance measure Rank it , controlling for various fund characteristics. The coefficient on Rank it is significantly negative, as shown in Table 2 . In column (2), the interaction terms between performance rank and D U t and D D t are both included in the regression. The coefficients on the two interaction terms are both negative. However, only the coefficient on Rank it · D D t is significantly different from zero. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient on Rank it · D U t (-0.0066) is much smaller than that of the coefficient on Rank it · D D t (-0.3561). To test whether the relation between ∆s it and Rank it differs significantly in the up and down markets, we next regress ∆s it on Rank it and Rank it · D D t with fund characteristics controlled for in column (3). The coefficient on Rank it · D D t is significantly negative at the 1% level, confirming that the negative relation between interim fund performance and the change in fund return skewness is much stronger in bear markets than in bull markets. The results are consistent with the argument that fund managers' propensity to gamble is weaker during bull markets and stronger in market downturns.
In columns (4) and (5), we employ D E it and D R it to test the influence of market conditions on fund managers' behavior. The results are similar to those reported in columns (2) and (3). The magnitude of the coefficient on D R it is more than three times larger than that on D E it in column (4), and the coefficient on D R it is significantly negative in column (5). The results support Hypothesis 3 by confirming that the more bearish the market, the more likely managers are to respond to disappointing mid-year performance by increasing fund return skewness in the following months. While managers of mid-year underperforming funds resist the incentive to increase fund return volatility during bear markets because they value employment risk more highly than they do compensation incentives, their tendency to increase fund return skewness is elevated during market downturns. As stated earlier, this discrepancy might be rooted in the different underlying drivers of these two kinds of managerial behavior. Moreover, our evidence of fund managers' growing desire to gamble in bear markets is consistent with the findings in lottery studies, which have shown that gaining from gambling is especially attractive during market turmoil.
Interim performance and the adjustment of fund portfolio
Our analysis of fund managers' behavior in previous sections relies on fund returns as do most other studies. In this section, we continue to examine managerial gambling incentives using information on fund portfolio holdings and fund trades. Such an investigation would provide direct evidence on fund managers' propensity to engage in gambling and serve as a cross-check of previous results based on changes in fund return skewness. Specifically, we examine whether fund managers intentionally adjust the composition of their portfolios in response to interim fund performance. We carry out the investigation from two perspectives: the adjustment of portfolio diversification and the selection of stocks. 
where w 2 ji is the weight of stock j in fund i's portfolio. A higher value of D 1 i or D 2 i indicates a lower level of diversification.
i accounts for the covariances between stocks, and is defined as: 
where ∆D it is measured using one of the three diversification measures, ∆D m it is the median change in portfolio diversification of all funds in the same segment, and D (1) it is the portfolio diversification of fund i at the end of the first half of year t. The results are reported in Table 7 .
[Insert Table 7 about here]
The first two columns of Table 7 show that managers of mid-year losing funds tend to reduce the number of stocks in their portfolios after mid-year. The coefficient on Rank it is significantly negative at the 1% level, and the negative relation is robust to the control of various fund characteristics.
Columns (3) to (6), where ∆D 2 it or ∆D 3 it is used as the dependent variable, present similar results. Rank it is significantly negatively associated with the changes in all the three portfolio diversification measures from the first to the second half of the year. The evidence strongly supports Hypothesis 4 by showing that interim underperformance is likely to be followed by a reduction in portfolio diversification, which is consistent with our conjecture that managers of interim losing funds tend to trade portfolio diversification for higher fund return skewness after mid-year.
Selection of stocks
Fund managers' gambling propensity might also be reflected in their selection of stocks. We test whether they exhibit a preference for stocks with higher expected coskewness after mid-year misfortune. We conduct two types of tests, one at the individual stock level and the other at the fund-level.
Tests at the individual stock level
We first develop a stock-specific measure that indicates the average mid-year performance of all funds that hold the stock. 10 We denote the measure as the stock's average fund interim return rank (SAF R). 11 We calculate SAF R in three different ways to ensure the robustness of the results.
SAF R 1
it is defined as:
where n is the number of sample funds that hold stock i at the end of December of year t, and Rank jt is the interim performance rank of fund j. SAF R 2 it is defined as the average interim performance rank of funds that purchase stock i during the second half of year t. SAF R 3 it is the buy volumeweighted average, rather than the simple average, of the interim performance ranks of funds that purchase stock i after the mid-year of year t. At the end of each December, we sort stocks into deciles based on SAF R 1 it , SAF R 2 it , or SAF R 3 it . We then investigate the expected coskewness of stocks across the SAF R deciles. The expected coskewness of stocks is measured at the beginning of the second half of year t as we expect fund managers to adjust portfolio composition after observing their mid-year performance. We calculate expected coskewness based on daily stock returns over the first six months of the year. 12 Calculation using monthly returns over the past 60 months produces similar results.
[Insert Table 8 about here] Panel A of Table 8 reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean and median of expected stock coskewness for each SAF R decile. The average expected coskewness generally decreases across the the SAF R deciles, though not strictly monotonic. When decile median is concerned, stocks in the bottom SAF R decile have the highest expected coskewness while stocks in the top SAF R decile have the lowest expected coskewness. The results hold for all the three SAF R measures. The evidence is consistent with our expectation that stocks with higher expected coskewness are favored by managers of interim losing funds but avoided by those of interim winning funds.
In Panel B, we perform regression analysis at the individual stock level to examine whether midyear losing funds invest more in stocks with higher expected coskewness. 13 We divide sample funds into two groups based on whether their interim performance is below (losing) or above (winning) the median. The weight assigned to stock i in the aggregate portfolio of losing or winning funds at the end of year t is denoted as w it and is used as the dependent variable. We regress w it on stock i's expected coskewness measured at the beginning of the second half of year t, with the control of its size, book-to-market ratio, past return, stock price, turnover, dividend payment, a dummy indicating whether it belongs to the S&P 500 index, and the weight assigned to it by the same group of funds at the end of the first half of the year. Columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient on coskewness is significantly positive in the group of losing funds, but significantly negative in the group of winning funds. Column (3) further shows that the difference in the coefficient on Coskew it between the losing and winning fund groups is significantly positive. The evidence confirms that stocks with higher expected coskewness are more likely to be selected by mid-year losing funds but tend to be avoided by mid-year winning funds.
For comparison, we also regress w it on stock i's expected systematic volatility (Beta it ) and other control variables in columns (4), (5), and (6). 14 The results show that both groups of funds tend to invest less in stocks with higher systematic volatility. However, interim losing funds are less averse to such stocks, as the difference in the coefficient on Beta it between losing and winning funds is significantly positive. Column (7) shows that the control of stock's expected systematic volatility in 13 The regression analysis is motivated by Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) , which uses a similar approach in examining the relation between stock characteristics and investor under-diversification.
14 We calculate expected systematic volatility for each stock at the end of June of each year, using daily stock returns over the past six months. We regress daily stock returns on Fama-French three factors, where the three factors are market, size, and book-to-market factors. The coefficient on the market factor is the expected systematic volatility of the stock for the following period.
the regression does not change the conclusion that losing funds, compared to winning funds, have a stronger preference for stocks with higher expected coskewness.
The evidence presented in Table 8 reveals that the negative relation between interim fund performance and the change in fund return skewness is not coincidental, as managers of losing funds do exhibit an attempt to increase fund return skewness through seeking stocks with higher expected coskewness.
Tests at the fund level: portfolio-and trade-based analysis
Analysis at the fund level might provide more direct evidence on fund managers' adjustment of portfolio composition. We expect fund managers who attempt to increase (reduce) fund return skewness in the second half of the year to deliberately increase (reduce) the weight of stocks with higher expected coskewness in their portfolios after June. Again, the coskewness of a stock's daily returns in the first half of year t is used to proxy for its expected coskewness in the second half of year t. And the coskewness of a stock's daily returns in the second half of year t is assumed to be its expected coskewness in the first half of year t + 1.
We calculate the value-weighted expected coskewness of individual stocks in fund i's portfolio based on fund holdings disclosed at the end of June and December, respectively, and ∆p csk it denotes the change. If managers of mid-year losing funds incline to increase the portfolio weight allocated to stocks with higher expected coskewness, ∆p csk it should be negatively correlated with interim fund performance. We also calculate the change in the value-weighted expected systematic volatility of stocks in fund i's portfolio from the end of June to December of the year, which is denoted as ∆p beta it , to control for fund managers' tendency to increase (reduce) fund return volatility through seeking stocks with higher (lower) expected systematic volatility.
We first examine whether an increase in the value-weighted coskewness of individual stocks in fund i's portfolio contributes to an increase in its fund return skewness using the following regression:
The result in Panel A of Table 9 shows that the coefficient on ∆p csk it is 0.0024 (t = 3.43), confirming that fund managers could achieve their goal of increasing fund return skewness though expanding the exposure of their fund portfolios toward stocks with higher expected coskewness.
To examine whether fund managers increase portfolio coskewness after interim underperformance, we perform the following test:
where ∆p csk,m it is the median of ∆p csk it in fund i's segment, and p
csk,(1) it
is the value-weighted coskewness of stocks in fund i's portfolio at the end of June of year t. The results are reported in the first three columns in Panel B of Table 9 . Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the coefficient estimate of
Rank it is significantly negative, indicating that managers of mid-year losing funds are more likely to tilt their portfolios toward stocks with higher expected coskewness. And the control of managers' adjustment of portfolio weight assigned to stocks with higher systematic volatility and other fund characteristics does not change the result qualitatively.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
We also test Hypothesis 5 through examining the trades made by fund managers after the mid-year. For each fund, we examine its buy volumes for individual stocks and compute the valueweighted expected coskewness of stocks purchased by the fund during the second half of year t, or V B csk it . 15 Funds that intentionally increase their portfolio exposure to stocks with higher expected coskewness will have a greater V B csk it . Similarly, we compute the value-weighted systematic volatility of stocks purchased by fund i over the same period, or V B beta it . The trade-based measures reflect fund managers' active preference for certain types of stocks.
We replace ∆p csk it with V B csk it in Eq. (15) to examine the relation between fund return skewness change and the value-weighted coskewness of stocks purchased by fund managers after mid-year.
The result is shown in the second row in Panel A of Table 9 . The coefficient on V B csk it is significantly positively at the 1% level, confirming that an increase in V B csk it contributes to the increase in fund return skewness.
Based on V B
csk it , we perform the following regression:
where V B is the value-weighted coskewness of stocks purchased by fund i during the first six months of year t. The coefficient estimates of Eq.
(17) are reported in columns (4) to (6) in Panel B of Table 9 . The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using portfolio-based measure ∆p csk it as the dependent variable reported in columns (1) to (3) . The coefficient on Rank it is significantly negative in all three columns, suggesting that managers of losing funds are more active in seeking stocks with higher expected coskewness during the second half of the year. The evidence renders further support to Hypothesis 5.
In Panel C of Table 9 , we exclude 10% smallest funds, 10% largest funds, or 10% funds with the lowest mid-year returns to examine whether previous results of tests using portfolio-and tradebased measures are specific to small funds, large funds, or extreme losing funds. We re-estimate Eq. (16) and (17) with the control of fund characteristics including TNA, fund family size, fund age, fund flow, a dummy indicating whether fund i charges a load, turnover ratio, and expense ratio.
The results are similar to those reported in Panel B, suggesting that the negative relation between interim fund performance and fund managers' tendency to increase their portfolio exposures to stocks with higher expected coskewness is not driven by certain types of funds.
Another concern is that the estimation of the coskewness of individual stocks may introduce noise, which would affect the test results. We use dummies to identify stocks with high expected coskewness to reduce the impact of estimation errors. We compute the expected coskewness of all stocks in the CRSP universe, and label stocks in the top 50 th coskewness percentile as stocks with high expected coskewness. ∆p csk it is then redefined as the change in fund i's portfolio weight of stocks with high expected coskewness from the first to the second half of year t, and V B 
Performance consequences of managerial skewness-adjusting behavior
Previous sections present empirical evidence supporting our five hypotheses on fund managers' skewness-adjusting behavior, which reflects their performance-induced gambling incentives. In this section, we proceed to examine the performance consequences of managers' desire to gamble. Literature has shown that a security's skewness is negatively related to its excess returns (see, for example, Harvey and Siddique (2000), Barberis and Huang (2008) , Boyer et al. (2010) ). 16 It is therefore reasonable to expect funds that increase their fund return skewness to underperform their counterparts in subsequent periods. However, if the changing of fund return skewness and the adjustment of fund portfolio reflect fund managers' information advantage rather than their desire to gamble, funds that increase their return skewness may subsequently outperform their peers.
In each month in the first half of year t, we regress fund i's monthly excess return on its change in fund return skewness from the first to the second half of year t − 1:
where r imt is the monthly excess return of fund i in month m of year t and M KT mt , SM B mt , HM L mt , and U M D mt are monthly market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors. Other variables are defined as in previous tests. The coefficient on ∆s it−1 measures the performance consequence of a change in fund i's return skewness. As the change in fund return skewness is calculated at the end of year t − 1 and the performance consequence is measured in the following six months, this specification raises less of a concern over reverse causality.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 10 report the results. There is a significantly negative relation between the change in fund i's return skewness and its subsequent performance. This negative relation is robust to the control of return factors and various fund characteristics, and cannot be explained by the change in fund return volatility from the first to the second half of year t − 1 as measured by ∆σ it−1 . In unreported tests, we divide funds into quintiles based on ∆s it−1 , and find that the average monthly fund return difference between the top and bottom quintiles is -0.10% (t = 2.71) after the control of M KT mt , SM B mt , HM L mt , and U M D mt over the six-month period following year t − 1. The results indicate that an increase in fund return skewness has an adverse impact on subsequent fund performance, which is both statistically and economically significant.
In columns (3) and (4), we examine the performance consequences of fund managers' skewnessadjusting behavior based on the change in portfolio diversification, measured using ∆D 1 it−1 . 17 The coefficient on ∆D 1 it−1 is significantly negative, indicating that fund managers seeking to reduce fund portfolio diversification earn lower future returns on average. Columns (5) and (6) examine the performance consequences of fund managers' adjustment of portfolio exposures to stocks with higher expected coskewness. We replace ∆s it−1 with ∆p csk it−1 and ∆σ it−1 with ∆p beta it−1 in Eq. (18). The significantly negative coefficient on ∆p csk it−1 suggests that funds that increase their exposures to stocks with higher expected coskewness underperform in the following periods. In columns (7) and (8), we examine the performance consequence of fund managers' gambling propensity using the trade-based measures. The results show that funds that have increased their buy volumes for stocks with higher expected coskewness in the second half of year t − 1 underperform over the subsequent months. Taken together, all pieces of evidence consistently suggest that fund managers' gambling incentives manifested in their skewness-seeking activities do not help to improve fund performance on average. On the contrary, such activities erode fund value and damage shareholders' interests.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Conclusion
This paper examines the performance-induced gambling propensity of mutual fund managers by analyzing their tendency to alter fund return skewness in response to interim fund performance.
We present evidence showing that managers of mid-year losing funds are more likely to increase fund return skewness than their counterparts in the second half of the year, consistent with our conjecture that fund managers exhibit stronger incentives to gamble in the market when they have underperformed. Moreover, we find evidence suggesting that the skewness-adjusting behavior of fund managers is influenced by local gambling norms and market conditions. Managers of funds located in regions with more liberal views on gambling have a stronger propensity to increase fund return skewness when faced with the prospect of underperformance. And fund managers' gambling incentives are more evident during market downturns.
We also examine fund managers' adjustment of portfolio diversification and selection of stocks after mid-year conditional on their interim performance. Such an investigation not only helps to verify fund managers' performance-induced gambling propensity using data on fund holdings and trades, but also provides insight on how fund managers adjust fund return skewness. Managers of mid-year losing funds exhibit a stronger propensity to reduce portfolio diversification, which similar results. (2008)). Moreover, tests at both individual stock level and at the fund-level reveal that managers of interim underperforming funds tend to expand their portfolio exposures to stocks with higher expected coskewness. All pieces of evidence strongly support our conjecture that fund managers seek to increase fund skewness after interim underperformance.
In the final part of the paper, we evaluate the performance consequences of fund managers' gambling activities. We find that funds that have increased their return skewness, reduced portfolio diversification, or expanded portfolio exposures to stocks with higher expected coskewness are more likely to experience performance deterioration in subsequent periods, thus suggesting that the gambling incentives of fund managers are detrimental to fund performance on average.
Our study contributes to the mutual fund literature by showing that fund managers adjust not only volatility but also the skewness of their fund returns in response to interim performance.
Though the volatility-seeking behavior of fund managers has been studied extensively, their tendency to change fund return skewness is largely left uninvestigated. Our study fills this void. We contend that the skewness-and volatility-seeking activities among fund managers have different drivers, and we show that fund managers' performance-induced skewness-seeking behavior is robust to the control of their volatility-taking propensity. Our study also adds to the literature on investors' gambling behavior in the financial markets. Many studies have examined investors' skewness-loving preferences, mostly focusing on individual investors. We take a different perspective and specifically investigate mutual fund managers' performance-induced gambling incentives and skewness preference. Our findings suggest that individual investors are not the only group of gamblers in the stock market. Institutional investors, whose gambling desire is inflated by recent underperformance, are prone to join individual investors and try their fortunes though gambling. This table provides summary statistics for the sample of actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds with an investment objective of "Aggressive Growth", "Growth", "Maximum Capital Gains", "Small Capitalization Growth", "Long Term Growth", or "Growth and Income" from 1962 to 2009. In this and all the following tables, observations with T N A (total net assets) less than $1 million are excluded. Funds which invest less than 80% of their assets in domestic equities are excluded as well. Fund size is total net assets under management at the beginning of each year. Fund family size equals the sum of total net assets of mutual funds that have an identical management company name. Fund age is measured as the number of years since inception. Common stock proportion is the percentage of fund assets invested in common stocks. Fund flow is calculated as the annual growth rate in total assets under management after adjusting for asset appreciation. Maximum total load is the sum of the maximum front load and the maximum rear load of a fund. Turnover ratio is the minimum of aggregate purchases of securities or aggregate sales of securities, divided by the average T N A of the fund in a year. Expense ratio is the ratio of total investment shareholders pay for the fund's operating expenses. Fund return volatility and skewness are the standard deviation and skewness of the fund returns throughout a year, respectively. Protestant (Catholic) proportion is the concentration of Protestant (Catholic) adherents in the population of a county where sample funds are located. Catholic-Protestant Ratio is the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in the county. 
where ∆sit is the change in the return skewness of fund i from the first to the second half of year t, Retit is the compound total return through the first half of the year, and Rankit is the rank of fund i within the sample funds in year t based on Retit. T N Ait−1 and F F sizeit−1 are total net assets managed by fund i and the size of the fund family to which fund i belongs, both in log terms, respectively. Ageit−1 is the logarithm of fund age, F lowit−1 is the flow of fund i, and D Load it−1 is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i charges a load and zero otherwise. T urnit−1 and Expit−1 are the turnover ratio and expense ratio of fund i, respectively. ∆σit is the change in the standard deviation of the fund return from the first to the second half of the year, ∆s m it is the median change in the return skewness of all funds in the same segment, and s (1) it is the return skewness of fund i in the first half of year t. Panel A reports the baseline regression results. Panel B reports the results using alternative specifications. In columns (1) and (2), we use ∆s U E it , the unexpected change in fund return skewness, instead of ∆sit as the dependent variable in the regressions. The construction of ∆s U E it is detailed in Section 3.2.1. In columns (3) and (4), we use the bootstrapped standard errors to calculate t-values of estimated coefficients. In columns (5) and (6), we control for the square of the change in the standard deviation of the fund return from the first to the second half of the year, or ∆σ 2 it , to capture the non-linear shift in fund return volatility. Columns (7) and (8) show results of piecewise linear regressions, where Rank
Low it and Rank
High it represent performance rank in the bottom and top 50 th percentiles, respectively. Panel C presents the results of subsample tests, where we control for time-and segment-fixed effects as well as fund characteristics, and cluster the standard errors of estimated coefficients by fund. For brevity, only the coefficient on Rankit is reported. In all the three panels, the t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Baseline estimates
Cons. 
Cons.
-0.2843***-0.2611*** 0.2510*** -0.1844** 0.2555*** -0.5670*** 0.2329*** -0.5326** This table presents the coefficients of the following regressions:
where ∆sit is the change in the return skewness of fund i from the first to the second half of year t and Rankit is the rank of fund i within the sample funds based on its compound total return in the first half of year t. Dit is a dummy variable defined according to various characteristics of fund i. ∆σit is the change in the standard deviation of the fund return from the first to the second half of the year, ∆s m it is the median change in the return skewness of all funds in the same segment, and s (1) it is the return skewness of fund i in the first half of year t. We estimate the model controlling for time-fixed effects. Segment-fixed effects are also controlled for except in row (9) . For brevity, only the coefficient estimates of Rankit and Rankit · Dit are reported, with corresponding t-values based on standard errors clustered by fund reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Dummy Variable Definition of the dummy variable
No. of Obs. 
where ∆sit is the change in the return skewness of fund i from the first to the second half of year t and Rankit is the rank of fund i within the sample funds based on its compound total return in the first half of year t. P ROTt (CAT Ht) is the proportion of Protestant (Catholic) adherents in the county where fund i is located. CP RAT IOt is the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in the county. ∆σit is the change in the standard deviation of the fund return from the first to the second half of the year, ∆s m it is the median change in the return skewness of all funds in the same segment, and s (1) it is the return skewness of fund i in the first half of year t. Panel A reports the results based on all sample funds with the control of both time-and segment-fixed effects. In columns (4) to (6), we further control for fund characteristics, including T N A, fund family size, fund age, fund flow, a dummy indicating whether fund i charges a load, turnover ratio, and expense ratio. For brevity, coefficient estimates of these control variables are suppressed. Panel B repeats the regression in column (6) of Panel A when funds located in the states of Massachusetts, New York, and/or California are excluded. For brevity, only the coefficients on Rankit, CP RAT IOt, and Rankit · CP RAT IOt are reported. In both panels, the t-values in parentheses are estimated based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
where ∆sit is the change in the return skewness of fund i from the first to the second half of year t, Rankit is the rank of fund i within the sample funds based on its compound total return in the first half of year t, ∆σit is the change in the standard deviation of the fund return from the first to the second half of the year, ∆s m it is the median change in the return skewness of all funds in the same segment, and s (1) it is the return skewness of fund i in the first half of year t. For brevity, only the coefficient estimate of Rankit is reported, with its t-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
where ∆sit is the change in the return skewness of fund i from the first to the second half of year t and Rankit is fund i's interim performance rank within the sample funds in year t. D 
is an indicator for NBER expansion (recession) periods. T N Ait−1 and F F sizeit−1 are total net assets managed by fund i and the size of the fund family to which fund i belongs, both in log terms, respectively. Ageit−1 is the logarithm of fund age, F lowit−1 is the flow of fund i, and D Load it−1 is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i charges a load and zero otherwise. T urnit−1 and Expit−1 are the turnover ratio and expense ratio of fund i, respectively. ∆σit is the change in the standard deviation of the fund return from the first to the second half of the year, ∆s m it is the median change in the return skewness of all funds in the same segment, and s (1) it is the return skewness of fund i in the first half of year t. We estimate the model controlling for time-and segment-fixed effects. For brevity, coefficient estimates of control variables for fund characteristics are suppressed. The t-values estimated based on standard errors clustered by fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
where ∆Dit is the change in the portfolio diversification of fund i from the first to the second half of year t, and Rankit is the rank of fund i within the sample funds based on its compound total return in the first half of year t. T N Ait−1 and F F sizeit−1 are total net assets managed by fund i and the size of the fund family to which fund i belongs, both in log terms, respectively. Ageit−1 is the logarithm of fund age, F lowit−1 is the flow of fund i, and D Load it−1 is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i charges a load and zero otherwise. T urnit−1 and Expit−1 are the turnover ratio and expense ratio of fund i, respectively. ∆σit is the change in the standard deviation of the fund return from the first to the second half of the year, ∆D m it is the median change in portfolio diversification of all funds in the same segment, and D (1) it is the portfolio diversification of fund i at the end of the first half of year t. Portfolio diversification is defined as the inverse of the number of stocks in the fund portfolio (D (3) and (4), and a combination of the Herfindahl index and covariances between stocks in the fund portfolio (D 3 it ) in columns (5) and (6) . All three diversification measures are ranked in each time period to reduce noise in estimation. The construction of the diversification measures is detailed in Section 6.1. We estimate the model with the control of time-and segment-fixed effects. The t-values estimated based on standard errors clustered by fund are reported in parentheses ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (1) and (2), stocks are sorted into deciles based upon SAF R 1 it , which is the average interim performance rank of funds that hold the stock at the end of December of year t. In columns (3) and (4), stocks are sorted based on SAF R 2 it , which is the average interim performance rank of funds that purchase the stock during the second half of year t. In columns (5) and (6), stocks are sorted based on SAF R 3 it , which is the buy volume-weighted average interim performance rank of funds that purchase the stock during the second half of year t. The construction of SAF R is detailed in Section 6.2.1. Coskewit is the expected return coskewness of stock i measured based on daily stock returns during the first half of year t. The time-series averages of the cross-sectional mean and median of Coskewit is reported for each SAF R decile. Panel B presents the results of stock-level regressions, where the dependent variable is the weight assigned to a stock in the aggregate group portfolio of losing or winning funds at the end of December of each year (wp,it). A fund is classified into the winners (losers) group if its interim performance is above (below) the median in the year. Betait is the expected systematic volatility of stock i measured based on daily stock returns during the first half of the year. LOGM Eit, BMit, M OMit, RETit, P RCit, and T Oit are stock size in log terms, book-to-market ratio, return over the past 12 months, return over the past one month, stock price, and average monthly turnover. DIVit equals one if stock i pays dividend during the previous year, and zero otherwise. S&P 500it equals one if stock i belongs to the S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. w (1) p,it is the weight assigned to stock i in the aggregate group portfolio at the end of June. All the stock characteristics are measured at the end of June of each year. We estimate the model controlling for time fixed effects. The estimated coefficients are multiplied by 100 and reported, with corresponding t-values based on standard errors clustered by fund reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
it + it, where ∆sit is the change in the return skewness of fund i from the first to the second half of year t, ∆p csk it is the change in the value-weighted expected coskewness of individual stocks in fund i's portfolio from the first to the second half of year t, and V B csk it is the value-weighted expected coskewness of individual stocks purchased by fund i during the second half of year t. ∆σit is the change in the standard deviation of the fund return, ∆s m it is the median change in the return skewness of all funds in the same segment, and s (1) it is the return skewness of fund i in the first half of year t. For brevity, only the coefficients on p is the value-weighted expected coskewness of stocks purchased by fund i during the first half of the year. In columns (3) and (6), we further control for fund characteristics, including T N A, fund family size, fund age, fund flow, a dummy indicating whether fund i charges a load, turnover ratio, and expense ratio. For brevity, coefficient estimates of control variables for fund characteristics are suppressed.
Panel C reports results of several robustness checks, where we exclude 10% smallest funds, 10% largest funds, or 10% funds with the lowest mid-year returns. We also redefine ∆p csk it and V B csk it as the change in portfolio weight and the standardized buy volume of stocks with an expected coskewness above the 50 th percentile among all common stocks within the CRSP universe. We further conduct subsample tests based on funds located in regions with a CP RAT IO above or below the median, and based on whether the average monthly excess market return in the first half of year t is positive (bull markets) or negative (bear markets). Fund characteristics are controlled for in all the robustness and subsample tests. For brevity, only the coefficient on Rankit is reported.
In all three panels, we estimate the models controlling for time-and segment-fixed effects. The t-values estimated based on standard errors clustered by fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 10 : Performance Consequences of Managerial Skewness-Adjusting Behavior. This table examines the performance consequences of the skewness-adjustment behavior of mutual fund managers. The dependent variable is the monthly excess return of fund i over the first half of year t. ∆sit−1 is the change in fund i's return skewness from the first to the second half of year t − 1, measured at the end of year t − 1. ∆D
is the change in fund i's portfolio diversification measured based on its holdings at the end of June and December of year t − 1, where diversification is defined as the inverse of the number of stocks in the fund portfolio. ∆p csk it−1 is the change in the value-weighted expected coskewness of individual stocks in fund i's portfolio. V B csk it−1 is the value-weighted expected coskewness of individual stocks purchased by fund i during the second half of year t − 1. ∆σit−1 is the change in fund i's return volatility from the first to the second half of year t − 1, ∆p beta it−1 is the change in the value-weighted systematic volatility of individual stocks in fund i's portfolio, and V B beta it−1 is the value-weighted expected systematic volatility of individual stocks purchased by fund i during the second half of year. T N Ait−1 and F F Sizeit−1 are total net assets managed by fund i and the size of the fund family to which fund i belongs, both in log terms, respectively. Ageit−1 is the logarithm of fund age. F lowit−1 is the flow of fund i. D Load it−1 is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i charges a load and zero otherwise. T urnit−1 and Expit−1 are the turnover ratio and expense ratio of fund i, respectively. M KTmt, SM Bmt, HM Lmt, and U M Dmt represent monthly market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors over the first half of year t, respectively. We estimate the model controlling for time-and segment-fixed effects. The t-values based on standard errors clustered by fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) where ∆sit is the change in the return skewness of fund i from the first to the second half of year t, Rankit is the rank of fund i within the sample funds based on its compound total return in the first half of year t, ∆σit is the change in the standard deviation of the fund return from the first to the second half of the year, ∆s m it is the median change in the return skewness of all funds in the same segment, and s (1) it is the return skewness of fund i in the first half of year t. The solid line in the figure represents average monthly excess market return and the dashed line depicts the coefficient on interim fund performance rank from the regression. 
